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Since 1985, the United States and Mexico have had  ment. The last three areas include only one working
a number of bilateral agreements addressing impor-  group each.
tant economic and political  issues. In June of 1990,  Presidents Bush and Salinas de Gortari referred to
President George Bush and President Carlos Salinas  the initial proposal of the United States-Mexico FTA
de Gortari formally agreed  that the development of  as  a "powerful  engine for economic  growth which
a comprehensive  United States-Mexico  Free Trade  would create new jobs, stimulate economic activity
Agreement (FTA), aimed at reducing in the short-run  and  open new markets"  (Wagenhim).  Preliminary
and eliminating  in the long-run tariff and non-tariff  impact studies conducted by the United States Inter-
trade barriers, would be the best way to broaden and  national Trade Commission (USITC),  Almon, Peat
improve bilateral economic relations and strengthen  Marwick,  Sobarzo,  and Hinojosa-Ojeda  et al. indi-
the  competitiveness  of both  countries.  In August  cate that a United States-Mexico  FTA would likely
1990, under the recommendation of both countries'  benefit both countries.  United  States  Trade Repre-
trade representatives, both Presidents agreed  to be-  sentative Carla Hills has pointed out that "all players
gin  trade negotiations  for a  United  States-Mexico  would  win"  in  the  proposed  NAFTA  among  the
FTA. Subsequently,  Canada, with whom the-United  United  States,  Mexico,  and  Canada  (Auerbach).
States signed an FTA in 1988, expressed interest in  However,  there  is  concern  among  special  interest
joining the United States-Mexico  FTA negotiations  groups  in  the United  States,  Canada,  and Mexico
in September  1990. In February  1991,  the govern-  with respect to the impacts that NAFTA could have
ments  of the  United  States,  Mexico,  and  Canada  in certain economic  sectors  and industries.  In par-
announced  the desire to develop a North  American  ticular, Mead, Faux and Spriggs, Faux and Rothstein,
Free Trade Agreement  (NAFTA). In May  1991,  an  and Prestowitz  et  al.  concede  that NAFTA  can be
extension of "fast track" authority to continue nego-  economically  desirable, but  they challenge  the as-
tiations of the proposed NAFTA through July 1993  sumption  that the huge  differences  in salaries  and
was  approved  by  Congress  in  the  United  States;  overall  living  standards  among  the three  countries
formal negotiations  for NAFTA began on June  12,  will lead to a mutually  beneficial division of labor.
1991.  They point out that the agreement could shift more
As  of November  1991,  after  several  meetings  high-value work to Mexico than it could create in the
among trade representatives of the three nations, six  United States.
negotiation areas have been established and eighteen  This paper examines both the Mexican position in
working groups have been formed. The negotiation  the NAFTA negotiations  and the possible implica-
areas are:  (1) Market access; working groups in this  tions of NAFTA for the Mexican economy, particu-
area include tariff and non-tariff trade barriers,  rules  larly for the Mexican  agricultural sector.  The paper
of origin, governmental  purchases,  agriculture,  the  is organized as follows. The overall economic envi-
automobile  industry,  and other  industries  such  as  ronment within  which the  Mexican  economy  has
textiles and petrochemicals.  (2) Trade rules; working  operated in the last few years is examined first. The
groups  in  this  area  include  snap-back  provisions;  Mexican  agricultural  sector  and the  government's
antidumping, subsidies and compensatory taxes; and  role in the sector are looked at next. Then the United
standards.  (3) Services; working groups include gen-  States-Mexico-Canada  trade  relations  and the pro-
eral  principles,  financial,  insurance,  transportation,  posed NAFTA are examined. In the closing sections,
telecommunications,  and other services. (4) Invest-  some of the issues surrounding the NAFTA negotia-
ment.  (5)  Intellectual  property.  (6)  Dispute  settle-  tions are outlined, and the possible implications for
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45the Mexican economy, and for the Mexican agricul-  measures contributed to a reduction in the inflation
tural sector in particular, are explored.  rate to 52 percent by the end of 1988. However, high
levels of uncertainty with respect to the sustainabil-
THE GENERAL ECONOMY  ity of such economic performance were still present
The year of 1982 was the milestone year in which  in the economy. High nominal interest rates, moder-
Mexican views with respect to international relations  ate growth of the economy, about 1.4 percent growth
and international interdependence  began to change.  in real Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and a trade
By the end of 1982, the combined impacts of a large  balance of almost $2 billion were recorded in 1988.
public deficit and the lack of foreign financing lead  At  the beginning  of President  Carlos  Salinas  de
to a severe increase in inflationary  pressures in the  Gortari's administration in December  1988, a com-
Mexican  economy.  The inflation  rate  in  1982  in-  prehensive  strategy  aimed  at  achieving  medium-
creased to almost 100 percent from under 30 percent  term  economic  growth,  with  price  stability  and  a
in  1981.  Additionally,  the Mexican  economy  was  sustainable balance of payments, was adopted. A key
highly regulated, and economic recovery was felt to  element of this strategy for economic recovery was
be out  of reach.  Shortly after  the 1982  debt crisis,  finding a medium-term solution to the foreign debt
Mexican government officials, under the administra-  burden on the economy. After the adoption of alter-
tion of President Miguel de la Madrid, embarked on  native domestic policies and successful negotiations
a major policy effort called "economic realism"  to  to restructure the foreign debt, the results were en-
correct  a wide range of macroeconomic  and struc-  couraging.  In 1989 real GDP grew 3.1 percent,  sig-
tural imbalances present in the Mexican economy.  nificant increases in private investment and domestic
That program called for strengthening fiscal policy  savings were recorded,  inflation was reduced to un-
and liberalizing exchange  and trade controls.  Inter-  der  20  percent,  the trade  balance  was reduced  to
nal and external imbalances were reduced, and the  -$0.6 billion, and the overall government deficit was
economy began to recover by the end of 1984. How-  reduced to 6 percent of GDP in  1989. In 1990, real
ever, it became evident  in early  1985 that the eco-  GDP grew 3.9 percent, inflation was slightly below
nomic  recovery  was  not  being  sustained.  30 percent, and the government had a deficit of 3.5
Furthermore,  with  the September  1985 earthquake  percent of GDP. Inflation for the first eleven months
in Mexico  City and the sharp drop of oil prices in  of  1991  was  13.3  percent,  with  the overall  1991
early  1986,  the fiscal  and external positions of the  inflation rate expected to be close to the  16 percent
Mexican  economy  worsened.  By mid-1986  a new  goal  set  by  the  Mexican  government,  real  GDP
economic  recovery  program,  "increased  economic  growth in 1991  is expected to be approximately 4.5
realism,"  backed  by  the  international  community,  percent, and the government deficit is expected to be
was adopted.  Under this program, Mexican foreign  under  2  percent of GDP. These  developments  re-
debt was restructured, fiscal and monetary policies  suited  from  a  broad  range  of  structural  reforms
were tightened, the exchange rate was sharply depre-  aimed at improving the private sector's performance
ciated, and increased efforts were made to both lib-  and reducing government  intervention in the econ-
eralize  trade and continue privatizing  public sector  omy.
enterprises. These policies along with a slight rise in  Overall,  the  current  economic  environment  in
oil prices contributed to moderate growth for Mexico  Mexico is much better than it was  five or six years
in 1987.  ago  when  there  were  serious  concerns  that there
Improvement  of the Mexican external position in  might be a social uprising. As Kalter and Khor point
1987  was  accompanied  by  a  marked  increase  in  out, some of the key elements in Mexico's rebound
inflation.  The  combined  effects  of high  levels  of  have been the opening of the trade system, divesting
nominal interest rates, increased pressures from la-  public sector enterprises,  tax reform, financial liber-
bor groups for wage increases, and the crash of the  alization, liberalization of foreign direct investment,
Mexican stock market in October  1987 resulted in a  and deregulation  of economic  activities.  Past gov-
159  percent  inflation  rate  for  that  year.  Thus,  in  ernment actions have included a significant decrease
December of 1987, a program called the "economic  of import  licensing requirements,  a significant re-
solidarity pact," aimed at strengthening the financial  duction of import tariffs,  a 70 percent reduction in
and  structural  policies,  and  which incorporated  a  public  sector enterprises, privatization  of the com-
price-wedge  pact among  labor, business, and gov-  mercial banking system, tax reform, liberalization of
emrnment,  was  adopted.  This  program,  which  was  foreign  investment  and foreign  ownership  regula-
extended through the end of 1988, led to a general-  tions,  and industrial deregulation  in transportation,
ized freeze on wages, prices, and the exchange  rate  communication,  petrochemical, fisheries, and other
(after a small adjustment  in February  1988).  These  industries.
46Trade diversification  efforts, along  with some of  nied by an increase in delinquent debts, crop insur-
the trade liberalization policies adopted by the Mexi-  ance payments, and non-viable projects (Montanes).
can government, have induced significant changes in  Additionally,  in  1981,  total  transfers  to  the Com-
the  composition  of Mexican  exports.  In  1982,  75  pania  Nacional  de  Subsistencias  Populares
percent of Mexican exports were oil-related and only  (CONASUPO),  the agricultural  marketing  regula-
14 percent  were from the manufacturing  sector.  In  tory agency,  were greater than its total revenues, for
1989,34 percent of the Mexican exports were oil-re-  the first time in history.  This would happen  again
lated  and 55 percent were from the manufacturing  during the  1984-1986 period. In late 1982 the SAM
sector.  program was scrapped as  a result of the drop in oil
Currently, the reforms  already in place are being  prices and the subsequent financial crisis into which
strengthened,  and  additional  government  reforms  the nation fell. This crisis, together with the Interna-
are being adopted to further deregulate the Mexican  tional  Monetary  Fund's  conditions  on emergency
economy and to create a stable and secure economic  loans,  persuaded  President  Miguel  de la Madrid's
environment which should induce increased foreign  new government to realize  that the Mexican econ-
investment.  The most  recent  of these  government  omy could no longer operate onthebasis of subsidies
actions includes the November 7,  1991, proposal by  and highly  protected and inefficient  industrial  and
President  Salinas  de  Gortari  to the  Mexican  Con-  agricultural sectors. In 1982, the government's defi-
gress to amend Article 27 of the Mexican Constitu-  cit had reached a record  16.9 percent of GDP and
tion  which  deals  with  the  regulation  of land  total transfers were 7.98 percent of GDP.
ownership (the "ejido" system) in rural Mexico.  The new administration's policy of "economic re-
alism" was to be measured initially by a reduction of
MEXICAN  AGRICULTURE  AND  THE ROLE  the fiscal  deficit,  which  by  1984  was down to 8.5
OF THE GOVERNMENT  percent of GDP. This was achieved by reductions in
The government  of Mexico has a long history of  federal spending  (total programmable  expenditures
intervention in the general economy and in the agri-  of the public sector were reduced in real terms by 8.9
cultural  sector  in  particular.  This  intervention  has  percent  in  1982  and  by  15.67  percent  in  1983),
increased during the last few decades, with the gov-  increases in internal public debt, increased taxation,
ernment's attempts to accelerate the country's devel-  and increases  in  the prices  of goods  and services
opment and distribute  its fruits in a more equitable  provided  by  the public  sector.  The price  index  of
manner.  In the agricultural sector, intervention took  these goods, excluding petroleum products, rose 37
the form of increased public  investment,  subsidies  percent  more than the consumer price index  (CPI)
for both production and consumption of agricultural  during the  1981-1987  period.  Reductions  in subsi-
commodities,  and  regulation  of  market  forces  dies to agricultural production  also took place.  For
through direct participation in marketing.  instance, subsidies to soybean and sorghum produc-
Official  policies  toward  the development  of the  tion were eliminated in November,  1984. Increased
agricultural  sector  resulted  in  impressive  rates  of  input costs  and strictly controlled  consumer prices
growth during the 1950-65 period, when the agricul-  had a devastating effect on the agricultural sector.
tural sector grew at an average  annual rate  of 4.23  The drop in oil prices in 1986 pushed Mexico into
percent. The next fifteen year period (1965-80) had  a new financial crisis, and the fiscal deficit reached
a slowdown, with an average  annual rate of growth  16 percent of GDP, almost as high as in 1982. Total
of 2.44 percent (Nacional Financiera).  transfers  continued to decrease  and total program-
In  1980,  President  Jose Lopez  Portillo's admini-  mable expenditures  of the public sector dropped  to
stration announced  the Sistema  Alimentario Mexi-  6.68 percent relativeto 1985 levels. The combination
cano  (SAM),  an ambitious  program which was  to  of the rise in the deficit and the drop in programma-
make Mexico self-sufficient  in corn and dry beans  ble spending clearly indicates the dramatic reduction
by 1982, and in other basic crops by 1985. The large  of government revenue in that year. In 1987 the fiscal
injection of subsidies into the agricultural sector that  deficit  increased slightly,  reaching  16.1  percent  of
the program required were to be financed with Mex-  GDP, as programmable public spending diminished
ico's oil revenues. Self-sufficiency  in the main agri-  another  4.69  percent.  Subsidies  to  consumption
cultural  commodities  was  achieved  in  1981,  at  a  (mainly wheat and corn) were reduced during 1986.
great public cost,  and good  weather played an im-  Finally,  interest  rates  rose,  squeezing  consumer
portant part (Segarra).  Fertilizer subsidies increased  credit,  as  the government  scrambled  for  funds  to
in real terms by 116 percent between 1980 and 1981.  keep itself solvent.
Also,  the 1980-1982 period  showed an accelerated  On  July  21,  1986,  Mexico  signed  the  General
growth  in credit for agriculture  that was accompa-  Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Codes on
47Standards, Licensing, Customs Valuation and Subsi-  mal government intervention is the key for the future
dies, and on August  26,  1986,  Mexico became the  growth and development of the Mexican economy.
92nd member of GATT. The process of "increased  The overall approach followed by the government
economic  realism"  achieved  greater  momentum  in the last few years has been  that of becoming  a
with this event, as import restrictions were gradually  facilitator for economic activity rather than an active
removed.  participant.  The  Mexican  government  has  figured
Although it was originally intended that  all non-  that "a dose of reality" is always good and that, as
tariff restrictions to trade would be eliminated by the  the Mexican saying goes, "no hay mal que por bien
end of  1988, this process  was completed  one year  novenga" (there isno bad thing thatwouldnotbring
early.  Two interrelated  factors  contributed  to this.  some good along with it).
Inflation had become  unacceptably high,  officially  UNITED  STATES-MEXICO-CANADA
estimated at 159 percent in 1987, and it was feared  TRADE RELATIONS AND THE NORTH
that were it not drastically reduced it would get out  AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
of control.  Additionally,  1988 was an election year
and the government  felt that if the incumbent party  Approval  of the  proposed  NAFTA  among  the
was to win the elections it had to reduce inflation to  United  States,  Canada,  and Mexico  represents  an
protect  consumers'  purchasing  power.  Hence,  the  opportunity  to create the largest commercial block
"economic  solidarity pact"  was  announced in  De-  in the world, with approximately 360 million people
cember of 1987. This pact required that all sectors of  and  a  combined  annual  GDP  around  $6  trillion.
'the economy  moderate their demands for price and  NAFTA would reduce and eventually eliminate tariff
wage increases. To facilitate the pact's success, the  and non-tariff trade barriers among the three coun-
process of trade liberalization was accelerated.  tries and would increase annual trilateral trade above
the current $230 billion. An important component of
Almost free imports  of agricultural  commodities  the proposed  NAFTA  is  agriculture.  Even though
helped  protect  consumers'  purchasing  power,  but  agriculture  represents  a small part  of  GDP  in the
severely  punished  Mexican agricultural  producers,  three countries (about 3 percent in the United States
especially  those for  whom the domestic price  was  erent in  xi  3.  percent in Canada), the 9 percent in Mexico, and 3.5 percent in Canada), the
higher than international prices. For example, in the  importance of the agricultural sector is relevant not
case of the livestock industry, imports of low priced  on  ce  of the  role  itl  in providing
offals supplied cheap substitutes  for domestic live-  food  and  fiber,  but because of the fied nature  of
stock commodities,  reducing  demand  for  all live-  investments  in the sector as well as its role as a net
Stock  products  regardless  of  their  international  creator of wealth.  Strictly speaking, primary sectors
competitiveness.  The administration was willing  to  which include  agriculture  and  extractive  industries
sacrifice some industries to curb inflation. Between  are net creators of wealth  and most  if not all  other
1980  and  1990, the average  annual  growth  rate of  economic sectors transform and/or add value to the
Mexican agricultural production was 0.84 percent.  commodities either created in agriculture or directly
By  the  end of President  Miguel  de la Madrid's  extracted from nature.
administration,  most agricultural commodity subsi-  There are many similarities and differences among
dies were directed at consumers, and particularly at  the United States, Canada, and Mexico. Similarities
the poorest consumers. A highly publicized one was  between  the United States and Canada abound, but
that given to the price of corn tortillas in 1988. Some  differences between the United States  and Mexico,
subsidization  of consumption and agricultural  pro-  and between  Canada and Mexico  are striking.  The
duction,  mainly  corn and  dry beans,  currently  re-  Mexican economy is about 40 percent of the size of
mains,  because  some  inputs,  such  as  credit,  the Canadian economy  and only 4 percent the size
fertilizers, and seeds are still being subsidized.  The  of the American economy.  Mexico's population is
tendency, however, has been to reduce these transfers  3.2  times larger  than Canada's and about one third
and to target only the poorest sectors,  as President  of the United States's. Per capita income in Mexico
Carlos Salinas de Gortari's administration feels that  is approximately  11 percent of that of the American
these social policies can no longer be justified.  For  and Canadian populations. Hourly minimum wages
example,  in 1990 the electricity rate for agricultural  are  8  times higher in the United  States  and over 6
use increased  130 percent,  and some irrigation dis-  times higher in Canada compared to Mexico. Rela-
tricts  are no longer  under government  administra-  tive population in the agricultural sector in Mexico
tion. The current administration feels that increased  is over  8.5 times higher than that  in the American
allocative  efficiency in the overall economy,  and in  agricultural sector and over 7 times higher than that
the agricultural sector in particular, along with mini-  in the Canadian agricultural sector. Total arable land
48in Mexico  is about 12 percent of that in the United  10 percent of Canada's imports from Mexico were
States and about 56 percent of that in Canada. Mex-  of agricultural origin.
ico has 1.7 million more farms than the United States  The main objective of an FTA is that of reducing
and more than 13.5 times more farms than Canada.  or eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers and other
The average size of farms in the United  States and  inefficiencies  which impede  or affect  trade among
Canada is 4 and 4.7 times larger, respectively, than  two or more countries. Much has been said about the
the average size of farms in Mexico.  justification for, or the inefficiencies of FTAs among
Bilateral  trade  between  Mexico  and  the United  two or more countries, in terms of the trade diversion
States is quite significant from the Mexican point of  or trade creation effects of such agreements (Viner).
view.  The United States is the destination of almost  Viner  argued  that  the  reduction  of trade  barriers
70 percent of total Mexican exports and the origin of  between  partner countries  would  increase bilateral
about  70  percent  of total  Mexican  imports.  Also,  trade flows, and thus induce trade creation which in
about 95 percent of Mexico's agricultural exports go  turn would allow the increase and the promotion of
to the United  States, while 75 percent of Mexico's  economic  efficiency  and growth.  FTAs,  however,
agricultural imports come from the United States.  can also induce trade diversion from third countries,
From the United States' point of view, trade with  and thus impose global welfare losses.
Mexico is not as significant, but Mexico is still the  It has been stated  that FTAs  are being  used as a
third  largest trading  partner  of the United  States,  substitute for more comprehensive  trade liberaliza-
after Canada and Japan. Mexico is the destination of  tion  agreements  among  many  countries,  such  as
about  7 percent of total American  exports  and the  GATT  (Schott).  However,  the inflexibilities exhib-
origin  of close to  6 percent of total American  im-  ited by  various  countries  and groups  of countries
ports. Also, close to 7 percent of American agricul-  participating in the current GATT negotiations have
tural  exports  go  to  Mexico  and  10  percent  of  induced several countries to find "second best alter-
American agricultural imports come from Mexico.  natives."  It should be noted that the theory of cus-
Since Mexico joined GATT in 1986, total Ameri-  toms unions deals with suboptimal situations such as
can exports to Mexico have more than doubled, and  FTAs, between two or more countries,  that are less
the rate of growth of American exports  to Mexico  comprehensive  than  GATT.  The  way  particular
has been twice the rate of growth of American  ex-  countries see this issue is: a "good FTA" that follows
ports elsewhere  (the average  annual  rate of growth  GATT rules and regulations between  two  or more
of agricultural bilateral trade between  Mexico  and  countries is better than no agreement at all. The 1988
the United States between  1982 and 1990 was  11.6  United  States-Canada  FTA and the  1991  Mexico-
percent).  Furthermore,  the  maquiladora  industry  Chile FTA are evidence of this position.
along the American-Mexican border has shown sig-  A key  element determining  the relevance  of the
nificant growth, at  18.8 percent per year during the  NAFTA, from the Mexican  point of view and with
1982-1989  period  (CIEMEX-WEFA),  and  has  respect  to agriculture  in particular,  is the comple-
proven to be an important contributor to economic  mentarity  of the current trade  between  the United
activity on both sides of the border  (M. Ray Perry-  States and Mexico,  and between Canada and Mex-
man Consultants, Inc.).  Also, it is estimated that for  ico.  Vollrath's  (199la)  relative  trade  advantage
each dollar of growth in Mexico,  15 cents are spent  measure,  which evaluates how well a country's par-
on American goods and services (Dombusch). It is  ticular commodity competes for resources with other
important  to  note  that  the Mexican  economy  has  sectors domestically and how well it competes glob-
become  increasingly  dependent on trade.  In  1989,  ally,  shows that the United  States and Canada have
total  exports  and imports  as  a percentage  of GDP  had a relative trade advantage over Mexico on dairy
represented,  16.3 and  15.1 percent,  respectively.  and  dairy  products,  coarse grains,  wheat,  oilseeds,
Bilateral  trade  between  Mexico  and  Canada  is  and  since  1981,  on  meats  and  livestock products
small when compared  to either Mexican-American  (Vollrath  199 lb; Vollrath and Scott). Also, the same
trade  or  American-Canadian  trade.  For  example,  measure shows that Mexico has a clear relative trade
trade for all products between Mexico  and Canada  advantage over both the United  States and Canada
in 1989 was close to $2 billion, compared to close to  on fruits and vegetables, and coffee, cocoa, tea, and
$52  billion trade between  Mexico  and the United  spices (Vollrath 1991b; Vollrath and Scott).
States.  In  1989,  Canada  was  a net  importer  with  Inaddition, Vollrath's(1991a)overallcomplemen-
Mexico.  Canada exported  to Mexico  $524 million  tarity measure,  which relates  trade advantages  and
and imported  over $1.4  billion from Mexico.  Ap-  disadvantages  between two  nations for a group  of
proximately 25 percent of Canada's exports to Mex-  commodities shows that, based on fourteen agricul-
ico in 1989 were of agricultural origin, but less than  tural subsectors, agricultural bilateral trade between
49the United States and Mexico is complementary and  ISSUES  SURROUNDING  THE NAFTA
that agricultural bilateral trade between  the United  NEGOTIATIONS AND MEXICAN
States  and Canada is competitive  (Vollrath  1991b;  EXPECTATIONS FROM A NAFTA
Vollrath and Scott). Thus, given the relative size of  Ever since thepossibility of anFTAbetweenMex-
Mexican  trade  with  the United  States,  the direct  icoand  UnitedStatescameabout,  nowwith ico and the United States came about, and now with
agricultural trade complementarity between Mexico  theproposedNAFTA,severalissuesand/orconcerns
and the United States, and the indirect agricultural  agreement have
trade complementarity between Mexico and Canada,anarisen. I classify such issues in two categories:  eco-
NAFTA would be a trade creating, rather than a trade  nomic adjustment issues and global welfare issues. nomic adjustment  issues and global welfare  issues.
distorting, mechanism.  Economic  adjustment  issues  are  those  which  are
Recent discussions on the implications of NAFTA  directly  linked  or which  have  to  be  addressed  if
for different  agricultural  subsectors point out  that  NAFTAistoapproved.Theseissuesincluderules NAFTA is to be approved. These issues include rules
because of the complementarity of  the United States'  of origin,  snap-back provisions,  dispute  settement
and Canada's agricultural trade with Mexico,  trilat-  procedures,  market  access,  phase-in  periods  and
eral agricultural trade is expected to increase in the  otherissuescurrentlybeingaddressein the NAFTA
short run (U.S.-Mexico Free Trade Agreement:  Ex-  negotiations. Global welfare issues are those which,
panding  Agricultural  Trade).  In  the  long  run,  as  in m  vie  ae indirectly related to the approval of
structural changes are internalized in the agricultural  NAFTA, including environmental, health, safety, hu-
sectors of the three countries,  some degree of spe-  man rights, and other issues.
cialization and possibly some increased competition 
could  be expected  to  occur  in certain  agricultural  Thereisnodoubtthateconomicadjustmentissue
subsectors. Thus, NAFTA is expected to create trade  like the  ones pointed  out  above  and others  on  the
with minimal or no impacts on trade diversion, and  negotiating  table will have to be properly addressed
would induce increased economic (price, allocative  if NAFTA is approved.  With  respect to the global
and  technical)  efficiency  (Dombusch).  This  is  of and  technical)  efficiency  (Dornbusch).  This  is  of  welfare issues, I believe that both the Mexican gov-
importance to the Mexican economy and the Mexi-  ernment and Mexican society realize the importance
can  agricultural  sector  in  particular  because  the  ofaddressingsuch issues andtherole that theyplay
Mexican  government feels that the way to improve  with respect to the future of Mexico.
the current low productivity of the Mexican agricul-  I also believe that the integrity of the conservation
tural sector is through increased competition.  and/or preservation of natural and human resources,
The Mexican  government  realizes that given the  as well as safety and health regulations,  will not be
relative trade of the United States and Canada with  compromised by NAFTA in Mexico, and that Mex-
Mexico, minimal  or no changes could be expected  ico does not expect either the United States or Can-
to occur with respect to some of the current domestic  ada to compromise the integrity of their resources or
agricultural policies in the United States and Canada  their standards with the approval  of NAFTA. Fur-
with NAFTA.  But the Mexican  government hopes  thermore,  in response  to  global  welfare concerns
that NAFTA could be used  to further induce  long-  initially expressed by Senator Bentsen, and by Rep-
term structural changes in the Mexican economy and  resentatives Rostenkowski  and Gephardt, when the
in  the agricultural  sector in  particular. That is,  the  extension of the fast track authority  was being con-
Mexican  government  does not see the approval  of  sidered,  they are  being internalized  in the negotia-
the NAFTA as "the" solution to the problems of the  tions  by  the  Mexican  negotiating  team,  although
Mexican economy, but as an important factor which  they are not explicitly included in the NAFTA nego-
will, in the long run, complement the Mexican gov-  tiations. Mexican  leaders realize  that the better and
ernment's overall strategy to induce future economic  the earlier they address these global welfare issues,
growth and economic stability. Although significant  the  sooner the  NAFTA negotiations can move for-
structural changes have already been proposed  and  ward.
implemented, the core of the changes and the redefi-  We must keep in mind, however,  that the efficacy
nition of the "rules of the game" as Mexico prepares  of the  efforts  and the  priority  assigned  to  global
to formally  integrate itself into the world economy  welfare  issues  are a function of economic growth,
will begin once NAFTA is  approved.  As Shwedel  and  that environmentally  protective policies can be
points out, [In Mexico, the] "Ways of doing business  best  implemented  under  a healthy,  growing  econ-
will have to be changed, power structures altered and  omy.  It  is not  surprising  that the  most developed
the market allowed to work. Compared with this, the  economies happen to be the  most environmentally
[NAFTA]  negotiations with  the United States  [and  conscious.  The  Mexican  government  is  and  will
Canada]  will be easy" (p. 19).  continue  to emphasize  implementing  and updating
50environmentally  protective  measures.  President  labor  and  restrictive  work  regulations  in  Mexico
Salinas de Gortari's administration has shown a de-  (Cook).
cisive  commitment  to  a cleaner  environment.  Re-  In my  opinion,  considering  the Mexican  experi-
cently  completed  and  on-going  environmental  ences of the 1980s, the most important driving force
assessment  studies  along  the  American-Mexican  for NAFTA in Mexico is the fact that the Mexican
border are being conducted to come up with strategic  government  has finally,  and  fully,  recognized  the
planning efforts which will ensure the preservation  relevance of the global interdependence of the world
of the integrity  of the environment  on the -border  economy. With respect to the agricultural sector, the
(Environmental Protection Agency and Secretaria de  Mexican government has recognized that the inade-
Desarrollo Urbano y Ecologia).  quacy  and  the  low  productivity  of  the  sector  in
Between  1989  and early  1991, President  Salinas  satisfying the current and future food and fiber needs
de Gortari's administration  increased the budget of  of the  population  is the  result  of many  years  of
the Secretaria de Desarrollo Urbano y Ecologia (SE-  inward-looking protection, and of the fragmentation
DUE),  Mexico's  equivalent  of the  Environmental  of the sector. Subsistence or traditional agriculture
Protection Agency,  more than 800 percent and shut  characterized by small-scale producers with little or
down 1,062 polluting industrial plants, permanently  no modem technology is common. With two million
closing  82,  including  Latin  America's  largest  oil  corn  producers  alone,  the  competitiveness  of the
refinery in Mexico City, which employed over 5,000  agricultural  sector  has  been  severely  affected.  In
people.  Other measures, which include the gradual  order to promote  future widespread  growth,  in the
elimination  of leaded  gasoline  production  and the  agriculturalsectorandtheoveralleconomy,thegov-
relocation of 24 environmentally  sensitive military  enment recognizes  that radical reforms and strong
industries  from  Mexico  City's  metropolitan  area,  commitments have to be made.
have been adopted to improve the environment in the  The current proposal of President Salinas de Gor-
Valley of Mexico. Also, the 1988 Mexican Environ-  tari to amend Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution
mental Law, named after the American experience,  has the principal  objectives of ending  land redistri-
requires  that environmental  impact  assessments be  bution and establishing  legal land tenure,  to allow
conducted  in relation with  any  new domestic  and  "ejidatarios" to use their land according to their own
foreign  investments.  In  addition,  I  would  like  to  needs and potential  and to enable stock companies
point out that strict enforcement of these and other  to  invest  in the  agricultural  sector.  This proposal,
environmentally  related  rules and regulations  are a  along  with  other  liberalization  of  foreign  invest-
priority of the current administration, and that Presi-  ments  and  foreign  ownership  regulations,  is  ex-
dent Salinas  de Gortari  has  stated  repeatedly  that  pected to create a secure and stable environment in
Mexico  will  not become  a haven  or  a refuge  for  the economy  which will  induce  increased  foreign
polluting industries.  and domestic investment, not only in the agricultural
sector, but in the rest of the economy  as well. Citi-
An issue pointed out earlier, which has been in the  corp Chairman John Reed (whose Citicorp bank is
minds of the negotiating  teams of the United States,  Mexico's  largest  creditor  with about  $2  billion in
Canada, and Mexico,  and in the minds of the differ-  debt) recently pointed out that "The Mexican  econ-
ent labor groups in the three countries, is the dispar-  omy is robust. Mexico is very attractive to [foreign]
ity  of minimum  wages  between  Mexico  and  the  investors"  (Mexico Business Monthly  1991). Aliza
United  States,  and  between  Mexico  and  Canada.  Chelminisky, Vice-President  of the Mexican Board
Hourly minimum wages in the United States, Can-  of Investment,  recently  stated  that cumulative  for-
ada, and Mexico are $4.25, $3.42 and $0.54, respec-  eign  investment  in Mexico  has  doubled  from $20
tively. It must be recognized, however, that the wage  billion in 1987 to an estimated $40 billion by the end
differential is a reflection of the productivity of labor  of 1991 (Mexico Business Monthly 1992). By sector
in the three countries.  That is, factors such as tech-  of destination, foreign  investment  in Mexico  went
nological progress, education, and global infrastruc-  into services  (63.13  percent),  industrial  (23.9 per-
ture determine the value of labor, and thus the wage  cent),  retail  business  (10.60  percent),  agriculture
rate.  For example,  even  though Vollrath's  relative  (1.41 percent), and mining (0.91 percent). By coun-
trade advantage measure indicates that Mexico has a  try of origin, foreign investment in Mexico has come
relative trade advantage in vegetable  and fruit pro-  from  the United  States  (66.13  percent),  Germany
duction over the United States and Canada, evidence  (6.34 percent),  Great  Britain (6.17  percent),  Japan
suggests that the significance  of that relative trade  (4.72 percent),  France  (4.44 percent),  Switzerland
advantage,  and  in particular  with respect to labor  (4.40 percent), Spain (2.26 percent), and others (5.64
costs, is undermined due to the lower productivity of  percent).
51Increased foreign investment,  and repatriation of  tion  of property  and repatriation  of  profits to  the
close to $35 billion estimated to belong to Mexicans  countries of origin.
abroad, is seen in Mexico as an important element to  We must remember that, in many ways, the major-
induce job  creation  in the  industrial  sector  while  ity of the Mexican society had been deprived of the
downsizing  the labor  force in agriculture,  and in-  opportunity  to acquire and be exposed to products
creasing productivity and profitability in the agricul-  from other countries, the United States included, for
tural  sector.  There  are obvious  labor force transfer  many  years.  The significant  increases  in  Mexican
problems  from the agricultural sector to the indus-  imports during the last few years are important,  but
trial sector, and the transition will most likely be very  in a way are a reflection of the short-term desire to
slow and painful,  as this policy could create severe  acquire  such goods  and services.  The growth  and
unemployment  problems (Faux and Rothstein).  But  preservation of the Mexican market must be looked
the Mexican government feels that this is the correct  at carefully, because sustained income growth is not
approach,  because the agricultural sector cannot be-  only in the best interest of Mexico,  but also  in the
come productive and profitable as long as the labor  best  interest  of creating  strong,  reliable  Mexican
force is so large. The goal of economic policy for the  markets for the United States and Canada.
agricultural sector is to induce specialization in the  Again,  I would  like to  emphasize  that  from the
production  of agricultural  commodities  in  which  Mexican point of view, the signing of NAFTA is seen
Mexico can become competitive and efficient. Presi-  as one more step in  the Mexican  government's  at-
dent  Salinas  de Gortari's  November  1, 1991,  3rd  tempt to integrate the Mexican economy to the eco-
State of the Nation Report provides a blueprint of the  nomic, social,  and  political realities  of the  times.
Mexican  government's goals and priorities, and po-  NAFTA is seen in Mexico as  one more link in the
tential directions for trade and investment.  chain  of political,  social,  and  economic  Mexican
strategic planning for the future. Whether NAFTA is
A FINAL COMMENT  reached or not, the Mexican government has already
President Salinas de Gortari's administration is far  embarked  on redefining  its  role domestically  and
from solving  corruption,  rapid population  growth,  implementing international trade liberalization poli-
unemployment,  and poverty  problems  in Mexico,  cies, which are expected to render positive results on
but his administration has been far more innovative  growth and development of the economy. Only a few
than those  of previous  Presidents.  In addition,  the  years ago,  very few people would have thought that
existence of government intervention, which affects  the sweeping reforms adopted and proposed  by the
trade  and the efficiency  of the Mexican  economy,  Mexican government would have been possible.
cannot  be  denied.  Mexican  government  officials  The  desire  to  reach  a NAFTA  with  the  United
have shown, however, that they intend to reduce that  States and Canada is very much in everybody's mind
intervention.  Attempts are being made, and I believe  in Mexico. With respect to the agricultural sector in
will continue  to be made,  to decrease  government  particular,  Mexican  agricultural producers  see that
intervention.  Through facilitating,  rather  than par-  they  must  be  ready  to take  a  hard  look  at their
ticipating  in economic  activities  in all  sectors,  in-  operations and to evaluate their prospects of survival
cluding  agriculture,  government  authorities  are  by competing in the production of agricultural com-
interested  in people  making  money,  because  fair  modities  in which they  have  a disadvantage.  It  is
enforcement  of tax  laws  is the  only way  that  the  expected that with NAFTA, the grain, oilseed, dairy,
Mexican government can make the investments nec-  and,  to some  degree,  other  livestock industries  in
essary  in  health,  education,  research,  technology  Mexico will lose, and that small or no gains could be
development,  and  global  infrastructure.  These  in-  expected  in  the  horticultural,  citrus,  certain  live-
vestments would enhance the welfare of  the Mexican  stock, and cotton industries (American Farm Bureau
society and the allocative efficiency and productivity  Research Foundation).
of Mexico's resources.  One  of the hardest  obstacles  to  NAFTA,  in  my
Regardless of what we say from our experience or  view, is that of selling it in the United States, more
learn from our economic models, increased and sus-  than selling it in Canada or Mexico.  The distribu-
tained trade, the exchange of goods and services for  tional impacts of the proposed NAFTA (among par-
money, among the United States, Canada, and Mex-  ticular states and industries within the United States)
ico, will occur if and only if there is money to be  are a key  to reaching an agreement, more so in the
made for both buyers and sellers. Increased foreign  United  States than in Mexico.  We must remember
investment  and other relations will  depend  on the  that fast track authority  was approved in the House
ability of the Mexican government to create a secure  of Representatives  by  the  Republicans  and  the
and stable environment which ensures the preserva-  Democrats from the southwest, and that most Demo-
52crats voted against it. Thus, it seems that, as pointed  Finally, I would like to point out that I have been
out by Frank Bouis, a citrus grower in Lake County,  impressed  with the openness of discussion and the
Florida, it's time for dialogue among Americans.  solicitation  of  input  from  the  different  economic
Given the current domestic economic problems in  sectors by the negotiating teams and the trade repre-
the United  States  and the  domestic perception  of  sentatives of the United States, Canada, and Mexico,
problems  of President  Bush's  administration,  a  both within their own countries and across countries.
NAFTA among the United States, Canada, and Mex-  It seems  to  me  that  everybody  has  realized  that
ico will not be reached  immediately,  and possibly  cooperation,  communication,  mutual trust,  and re-
will  have  to  wait until  1993  (Magnusson  et  al.).  spect are essential elements not only for the negotia-
However, Presidents Bush's and Salinas de Gortari's  tions of NAFTA, but for its success.
administrations seem to be determined to make it a  If sweeping  reforms  were  possible  in  Eastern
reality. After their December 14, 1991, summit meet-  Europe in the late 1980s, and the Commonwealth of
ing  in  Camp  David,  both  Presidents  urged  their  Independent States was born from the former Union
respective trade representatives to wrap up the trade  of Soviet  Socialistic  Republics  on December  25,
negotiations  "as soon as possible." In a recent news  1991,  why  not NAFTA  among the  United  States,
briefing, United  States  Trade Representative  Carla  Canada, and Mexico in early to mid 1990s!
Hills said that she hoped to have a first draft of the
agreement  by  the end  of January,  1992  (Mexico
Business Monthly  1992).
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